Collateral Constraints in a Monetary Economy by Cordoba, Juan & Ripoll, Marla





Janurary, 2002. First version: December, 1998.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of collateral constraints as a transmission
mechanism of monetary shocks. We do this by introducing money in the heterogeneous-agent
real economy of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Money enters in a cash-in-advance constraint and
is injected via open-market operations. In the model, a one-time exogenous monetary shock
generates persistent movements in aggregate output, whose amplitude depends on the degree of
debt indexation. Monetary expansions can trigger a large upward movement in output, while
monetary contractions give rise to a smaller downward movement. This asymmetry occurs
because full indexation of debt contracts can only be eﬀective following a monetary contraction.
In contrast, following a monetary expansion indexation can only be partial because debtors end
up paying back just the market value of the collateral. Due to the existence of both cash-in-
advance and collateral constraints, monetary shocks generate a highly persistent dampening
cycle rather than a smoothly declining deviation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The extent and mechanism through which monetary policy aﬀects real economic activity over the
business cycles has been a long-standing question in macroeconomics. Diﬀerent mechanisms that
explain the propagation of money shocks have been proposed. These include sticky prices, wage
contracting, monetary misperceptions, and limited participation.1 Another mechanism that has
received special attention in recent years is credit-market imperfections. In particular, the agency-
cost model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) has been extended to monetary environments in order to
analyze how ￿uctuations in borrowers￿ net worth can contribute to the ampli￿cation and persistence
of exogenous money shocks to the economy.2
In contrast with these agency-costs models, little attention has been devoted to analyzing mon-
etary economies in which agents face endogenous credit limits determined by the value of collat-
eralized assets. The environment we have in mind is one in which lenders cannot force borrowers
to repay their debts unless debts are secured. The use of this type of credit constraints appears to
be a promising avenue to generate the amount of ampli￿cation and persistence lacking in current
monetary models. This conjecture is motivated by the results obtained for the real-economy models
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998) and Kocherlakota (2000) among others, who have
shown that collateral constraints are a powerful mechanism of ampli￿cation and persistence of real
shocks.3 The central idea is that bad times for the economy are also times when the liquidation
value of the collateral is low, as potential buyers face diﬃcult times. This reduces debt capac-
ity, which in turn reinforces the fall of the collateral price, as potential buyers become even more
1See Cooley and Hansen (1998) for an illustration of the role of monetary shocks in the equilibrium business cycle
theory.
2See Fuerst (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000). Credit-market
imperfections in these models emerge from asymmetric information and costly-state veri￿cation. In this framework,
entrepreneurs borrow to pay the amount of the factor bill that is not covered by their net worth. Lenders must pay
a monitoring cost in order to observe the entrepreneur￿s project outcome. If an entrepreneur has little net worth
invested in the project, monitoring costs increase because there is larger divergence between the interests of the
entrepreneur and the lender, and so the premium for external ￿nancing is larger. With procyclical net worth, periods
of low output are associated with higher monitoring costs and a higher external ￿nance premium. This mechanism
ampli￿es the eﬀects of external shocks on production and investment.
3Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) also study the eﬀects of borrowing contraints in the presence of uninsurable risk.
They simulate a lump-sum monetary injection that changes the distribution of assets across agents.
2cash-strapped.
This paper analyzes the role of collateral constraints as a transmission mechanism of monetary
shocks. We do this by introducing a cash-in-advance constraint for consumption and investment in
the real-economy model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We exploit the simplicity of this framework
to study monetary injections carried out via open-market operations, as opposed to the less realistic
but simpler helicopter drops employed by many monetary models. Due to the presence of credit-
market imperfections, the exact path of the money supply is crucial to determine the real eﬀects of
open-market operations. We choose a parsimonious type of monetary paths which avoid changes
in long-run in￿ation and ￿scal variables. Thus, current monetary expansions need to be oﬀset
by future monetary contractions to avoid changes in in￿ation or unstable government-bond paths.
In this monetary economy the price of the collateral plays a central role in generating large and
persistent eﬀects of exogenous shocks. Moreover, the response of the nominal interest rate becomes
also crucial in determining the eﬀects of shocks.4.
The main ￿nding of this paper is that a monetary shock can generate persistent movements in
aggregate output, whose amplitude depends on the degree of debt indexation. In particular, the
larger the indexation, the lower the amplitude of the ￿uctuations. This result follows from the
fact that in our model, any redistribution of resources that favors borrowers is output enhancing
because in equilibrium borrowers are more productive than lenders.
We also ￿nd that business cycles are asymmetric in the model. In particular, while monetary
expansions can trigger a large upward movement in output, monetary contractions give rise to a
smaller downward movement. This asymmetry occurs because full indexation of debt contracts can
only be eﬀective following a monetary contraction. In contrast, following a monetary expansion
indexation can only be partial because in this case debtors repudiate their loans, there is debt
renegotiation, and they end up paying back just the market value of the collateral. This is so
because when there is a money expansion, the debt repayment increases by more than the market
value of the collateral, and so debtors have incentives to repudiate their debts.
4In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998) and Kocherlakota (2000) the interest rate is constant in equilib-
rium.
3A third property of the model is that monetary shocks trigger highly persistent dampening
cycles rather than smoothly declining deviations. This occurs due to the interplay between cash-
in-advance and collateral constraints. In particular, if following an exogenous shock borrowers were
able to acquire more capital, the full impact of the shock would be delayed because with a binding
cash-in-advance constraint, collateral can only be accumulated gradually. The cyclical dynamics of
the model is consistent with the hump-shaped pattern of output response to shocks that has been
observed in the data.5
Finally, the model also generates endogenous limited participation in the government-bonds
market due to the fact that in equilibrium, collateral constraints are binding only for a set of
agents. This implies that only unconstrained agents hold government bonds and can participate in
open-market operations. In this context, the propagation of the money shock is nontrivial because
agents diﬀer not only in whether they are or not credit constrained, but also in their productivity.
This paper oﬀers a novel approach to the propagation of monetary shocks by combining collat-
eral and cash-in-advance constraints, in a world where changes in money supply occur via open-
market operations. As indicated above, other papers in the literature emphasize the role of credit-
market imperfections based on the existence of agency costs, but do not explicitly consider collat-
eral constraints. For instance, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) embed the agency-cost model
into a dynamic new-keynesian framework that incorporates money, monopolistic competition and
nominal price rigidities. They ￿nd that credit-market frictions amplify and propagate shocks in a
quantitatively signi￿cant way. However, in this paper loan contracts are not indexed to interest rate
shocks, and it is not clear how important this nonindexation is in generating such ampli￿cation.
Further, their model is fairly complicated because in order to replicate the hump-shaped behavior
of output, they need to allow for lags in investment and diﬀerential credit access across ￿rms.
On the other hand, Calstrom and Fuerst (2000) conclude that even though the agency-cost
model delivers substantial propagation of monetary shocks, it does not deliver ampli￿cation. They
introduce money into the real model of agency costs developed in Calstrom and Fuerst (1998).
5See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000). We review these two papers below.
4Money enters through a cash-in-advance constraint on household purchases of consumption and
investment goods. Diﬀerent from Bernanke and Gertler (1989), this paper models entrepreneurs as
long lived. With long-lived borrowers, the net worth becomes a state variable which contributes to
the persistence of shocks.6
Outside of the agency-cost literature, our paper is also related to Cooley and Quadrini (1998).
They calibrate a monetary general equilibrium model with heterogeneous and long-lived ￿rms where
￿nancial factors play an important role in production and investment decisions. Firms diﬀer in size
and face borrowing constraints. Small ￿rms tend to rely more on external ￿nancing, and are more
sensitive to monetary shocks. The response of the economy to monetary shocks is characterized
by greater persistence than is typically found in other business cycle models. However, while
these shocks have only a small impact on aggregate output, they lead to considerable volatility in
￿nancial markets. Since our model is much simpler than Cooley and Quadrini￿s, we are able to
obtain analytical results and develop some intuition on the fundamental mechanisms that generate
greater persistence of money shocks.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes
the steady state. In Section 3 we discuss the dynamics of the model in response to a monetary
shock. The dynamic structure of the model can be summarized by a nonhomogeneous second-
order diﬀerence equation in the distribution of capital across agents. We parameterize the model
and provide a numerical illustration of the dynamics in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Technical details omitted in the text are presented in the Appendix.
2 The model
The model for this heterogeneous-agent economy is an extension of the framework of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). We keep the main features of their model and introduce money using a cash-in-
6Calstrom and Fuerst (2000) consider two diﬀerent ways of modeling entrepreneurs, and compare how the dynamics
of the model change under each scenario. In one scenario entrepeneurs are in￿nitely lived but discount the future
more heavily than households. In a second scenario, some entrepreneurs die each period and are replaced by new
births so as to hold steady population. It turns out that when entrepreneurs are in￿nitely lived net worth responds
more sharply to shocks.
5advance (CIA) constraint. There are two goods in this economy: a durable asset (capital), and a
nondurable commodity (output). We focus on the eﬀects of monetary shocks on the distribution of
capital across agents and abstract from capital accumulation. Capital is available in an aggregate
￿xed amount K.
There are two types of private agents in this economy. They are both risk neutral, but operate
diﬀerent technologies and have distinct discount factors. As will become clear below, around the
steady state the more patient agents become lenders, while the impatient agents become borrowers.
To abbreviate, let us refer to the two types of agents as borrowers and lenders. Both types of agents
face a CIA constraint and a collateral constraint. Finally, the government in this economy has the
only role of controlling money supply through open-market operations.
Events in this model occur as follows. Assume that there are two identical members per house-
hold who carry out diﬀerent activities. Households enter each period with money balances stored
from the previous period. Production takes place overnight. Early in the morning households
observe the money shock and borrowers repay their outstanding debts in output.7 During the day,
all markets are opened simultaneously. The ￿rst member of the household uses the money balances
to make transactions in both the capital and goods markets. He can buy or sell capital, and buy
goods.8 The second member stays at home selling the goods the household has produced, making
transactions in the money market and contracting new debt. Financial transactions must satisfy a
standard budget constraint for the household, as well as a collateral constraint.
2.1 Borrowers
The measure of borrowers is normalized to one. Their technology is given by the production function
yt =( a+c)kt−1,w h e r ekt−1 is their capital stock at the end of last period.9 They choose sequences
7Borrowers repay their outstanding debts at the beginning of the period to ensure that if the debt is repudiated,
lenders can appropriate the collateral. As in other CIA models, we assume that households value the diﬀerent
￿types￿ of output produced by other households. This implies that when lenders get paid in output, they will sell it
in exchange for money, and buy other varieties of output.
8Agents selling capital increase their money holdings and can use these balances to buy consumption good the
same day.
9Thus, at any point of time total supply of output is completely predetermined by the distribution of the capital
across the two types in the previous period.
6of consumption {xt}, capital holdings {kt}, nominal money balances {md
t}, private issued bonds
{bt}, and government-bonds purchases {ht} to solve the following problem for given sequences of
output prices {pt}, nominal capital prices {qn
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where the nominal interest rate Rt is de￿ned as the interest paid on loans made at t−1. Equation
(1) is the CIA constraint. Money is required for both consumption and investment. Equation (2)
is the budget constraint. The revenues collected through output sales, new bonds issued, and the
proceeds from government-bond holdings must be enough to accumulate new money balances, pay
outstanding debt obligations, and purchase government bonds. Finally, equation (3) corresponds
to the collateral constraint. Borrowing can only take place up to the point where the principal plus
interest is secured by the market value of the capital owned by the household.
It is assumed that only the fraction a of the output is tradable between borrowers and lenders.
The fraction c can be traded only among borrowers, and it can be interpreted as a subsistence
minimum consumption. We refer to this fraction as the nontradable output. The purpose of the
assumption is to avoid the situation in which borrowers continuously postpone consumption.10
In Appendix A we prove that around the steady state of the model the borrower￿s optimal
plan is to consume only the nontradable fraction of output, i.e. xt = ckt−1,t ob o r r o wu pt ot h e
10Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce a similar assumption. As will be explained later on, due to the linearity of
preferences borrowers would like to continuosly postpone consumption in exchange for investment. This is avoided
by introducing a nontradable fraction of output, which we think of as subsistence minimum consumption. Notice
that money is required to buy nontradable output because this type of output can be traded among borrowers. One
can think that households can only produce say fruit of a particular color, but they value fruits of all colors.
7limit imposed by the collateral constraint, and to invest all remaining resources. This implies that
borrowers do not purchase government bonds, i.e. ht = 0, and that the CIA constraint is binding.
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where β0 is the lenders discount factors. This condition is easy to satisfy if the discount factors are
similar and close to 1.11
























pt−1 is the in￿ation between t − 1a n dt,a n dqt ≡
qn
t
pt is the real price of capital.
The term in brackets corresponds to the real net worth of borrowers, which consists of the value
of tradable output, plus the value of capital held from the previous period, plus the real money
balances brought from the previous period, minus the real value of debt repayments, minus money
balances reserved for next period￿s purchases. Finally, the users cost of capital for borrowers, ut,
is given by




Thus, equation (??) says that borrowers use all their net worth to ￿nance the diﬀerence be-
tween the value of their capital qtkt and the amount they can borrow against each unit of capital
qt+1
Rt+1 (1 + πt+1)kt in real terms. Notice that borrowers discount the future value of the capital at
the nominal interest rate. This is the case, as will become clear below, because in equilibrium
borrowers need to borrow in order to buy capital.
11In this case,
(2−β−β0)
(1−β0) is some constant near to 2, and
(1−β)
β2 is close to zero. Further, in the proposed equilibrium
c
a is the ratio between the marginal propensity to consume and the marginal propensity to save for borrowers, which
c a nb ea s s u m e dt ob eb o u n d e da w a yf r o mz e r o .
82.2 Lenders
The mass of lenders in the economy is n. Lenders diﬀer from borrowers in their production tech-
nology and in the preferences. Lenders use a strictly concave technology, and they are more patient
than borrowers. Their production function is given by yt+1 = G(k0
t), where G0 > 0,G 00 < 0a n d
G0(0) = ∞. Lenders choose sequences of consumption {x0
t}, capital holdings {k0
t}, nominal money
balances {m0
t}, bonds holdings {b0
t}, and government-bonds purchases {h0
t}, to solve the following






















where the prime denotes a lender￿s decision variable. Lenders face a CIA constraint and a budget
constraint. We do not explicitly write a collateral constraint for these agents. Around the steady
state this constraint is not binding due to the fact that lenders determine the interest rate in the
economy, and therefore face an interior solution in bonds. In order to obtain this result, it is
assumed that lenders have a larger discount factor than borrowers.
Assumption 2. β0 > β.
Let β
0tΩt be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the CIA constraint and β
0tΛt the one for the




t : Λt = β0Ωt+1,
12These are the ￿rst order conditions for interior solutions. Assumptions above guarantee such result.
9b0
t : Λt = β0Rt+1Λt+1,
h0




t Ωt − β0qn
t+1Ωt+1 = β0Λt+1pt+1G0(k0
t).
It is immediate that the following arbitrage condition holds: Rt = Rh
t .F r o m t h e o p t i m a l i t y
conditions above is easy to obtain expressions for the equilibrium nominal interest rate and the















Notice that the equilibrium nominal interest rate Rt depends on the in￿ation rate at t+1. This
is simply due to the CIA constraint. Loans made at t−1 are repaid at time t in the bonds market.
However, lenders can only spend the returns of the loan at time t + 1, due to the CIA constraint.
Thus, lenders must be compensated for any in￿ation at time t +1 .
Equation (8) states that lenders equate their users cost of capital with the present value of its
marginal product. Since in equilibrium these agents are not credit constrained, the users cost is
simply the diﬀerence between the cost of buying capital today and the discounted value of selling
capital tomorrow. Notice that, in contrast with the borrowers, the lenders￿ users cost is not aﬀected
by in￿ation since the proceeds of selling the capital can be consumed or invested immediately,
without requiring previous accumulation of cash.
2.3 Government
The government controls money supply in this economy through open-market operations (OMOs),
which take place in the bonds market. Let Hs
t be the nominal supply of government-issued bonds.
10The stock of money supply Ms










so that at time t the government withdraws an amount τHs
t−1 of money and injects RtHs
t−1 back
into the economy. There are two comments in order. First, we choose a simple law of motion
for government bonds Hs
t . This simplicity is convenient for our purpose of analyzing the eﬀects
of a one-time money shock. Notice that following this shock, unless τ < 1 for all t,g o v e r n m e n t
bonds may exhibit an explosive path. To avoid this, any one-time money expansion through OMOs
must be eventually followed by a ￿policy reversal￿ or ￿sterilization￿ that guarantees convergence
back to the steady state. In particular, the size of τ determines the speed at which such monetary
contraction takes place. We are aware that since credit markets are imperfect in this economy,
real eﬀects of monetary shocks depend on the path of government debt. Although we choose a
parsimonious law of motion for Hs
t , we will discuss below the role of the size of τ in our results, as
well as other paths for government debt.
Second, notice that we do not consider a rebate of the in￿ationary tax. Since some agents
face corner solutions, such rebate cannot be lump-sum in general. For example, simple helicopter
drops redistribute wealth, and aﬀect agents decisions. Since here we want to focus on the eﬀects of
the ￿pure monetary shock￿, we do not include any rebates in the model. Tax rebates in fact may
reinforce the results of the paper.13
13The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose the economy starts oﬀ at the steady state and there is a one-time
money expansion. Assume that borrowers were to receive a money transfer that compensates them for the in￿ationary
tax in an amount higher than their optimal consumption. This may happen, for example, with helicopter drops. In
this case, borrowers will buy capital with the extra resources, and next period output would increase. This reinforces
our results because, as will be shown below, in this economy monetary expansions generate booms. More details on
this are available from the authors upon request.






t be the aggregate variables corresponding to the lowercase
individual variables. There are ￿ve markets in the model: consumption goods, capital, money,
private bonds, and public bonds. By Walras￿ Law one needs only to consider four of them. The







Bt = bt = −B0
t = −nb0
t,
K = Kt + K0
t = kt + nk0
t,


















which is just the quantity equation.
2.5 Steady state
De￿ne a steady state where all real variables are constant, and all nominal variables grow at the
constant rate π, which is the steady-state growth rate of money supply. From the law of motion of
government bonds it follows that to keep government￿s debt Hs
p constant in real terms, it must be
t h ec a s et h a tτ =1+π.T h u s ,i fτ > 1t h e nπ > 0, while for τ ≤ 1, π =0 .
Let d be the steady-state government bonds to money supply ratio, i.e., d ≡ Hs
Ms which can also
be seen as the public debt to money ratio. Using the law of motion of money supply and the fact









which implies that when π =0 ,t h e nHs =0 .
Next, it is easy to see that the steady-state users cost of capital for lenders and borrowers is the
same: u = u0 = q(1 − β0). Further, since under the proposed equilibrium the collateral constraint
(3) binds for the borrowers, we can use R, u0 and the budget constraint of these agents (2) to
get: u = a + c − Md
pK∗,w h e r eK∗ is the borrowers￿ steady-state capital level. Next, using the CIA
constraint (1) one obtains: Md
p = cK∗ (1 + π), i.e. borrowers￿ real money balances exactly cover
their consumption adjusted by in￿ation.
Combining the last two expressions we obtain: u = a − πc.N o t i c et h a ti fπ = 0, we obtain the
intuitive results that Md
p = cK∗, and u0 = u = a. This last equation means in a steady state with
no money growth, the users cost equals the tradable marginal product of capital.








(β0)2 (a − πc) (10)
The equation above, along with Assumption 1 imply that in equilibrium borrowers have higher
marginal product of capital than lenders.
The following proposition summarizes the main features of the steady state.
Propostion 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2,




(β0)2 (a − πc) there exists a unique steady state;
(ii) ∂K∗
∂π 6=0f o r( 1+2 π)c 6= a, so that in￿ation aﬀects the steady-state output Y ∗.
Proof: The existence of a unique steady state level K∗ is guaranteed from the properties of the
production function G(.). It is easy to see that the left-hand side of equation (10) is con-





(β0)2 (a − πc) the left and right-hand side cross only once. Figure 1 illustrates the determina-
tion of the steady state. The second property follows easily.
It is interesting that in the long run money is not superneutral as indicated by Proposition 1,
(ii). The intuition for this result is as follows. In￿ation acts as a tax for all agents, but in the
margin it aﬀects diﬀerently borrowers and lenders. Higher in￿ation decreases the marginal cost
of investing for both types, i.e. it decreases the users cost of capital. For a given K∗, borrowers
net worth decreases with higher in￿ation because they must demand more money to sustain their
consumption, cK∗. Further, since borrowers are credit constrained, they are in a corner solution.
In contrast, lenders have an interior solution and since u has decreased, their marginal bene￿to f
investing needs to decrease, which can only happen if lenders￿ capital holdings, K − K∗,i n c r e a s e .
Thus, money is not superneutral due to the asymmetric eﬀect of in￿ation on constrained and
unconstrained agents.14
3D y n a m i c s
To simplify the analysis, we only present the dynamics of the model around the steady state,
and assume zero steady-state in￿ation, π =0 . The solution for the case π > 0 is summarized in
Appendix D. We also assume that β0 is close to 1. This occurs, for example, if the length of the
periods is small. This assumption allows as to obtain some sharp analytical results, but numerical




t−1,i . e . gt is
one plus growth rate of money supply, vt ≡
pt
pt−1,i . e .vt is one plus the in￿a t i o nr a t e .T h u s ,i nt h e
steady state, g = v =1+π. In general, let b xt = xt−x∗
x∗ denote the rate of deviation of a variable x
from its steady state value.
14If the borrowers￿ propensity to consume
c
a+c is larger than 0.5 then higher in￿ation reduces output, a result
consistent with Abel (1984). However, if money is injected via helicopter drops rather than via OMOs, higher steady-
state in￿ation may have the opposite results, i.e. higher π implies larger K
∗ and larger Y
∗. This occurs if borrowers
receive a fraction of the transfer higher than their steady-state consumption share, α ≡
cK∗
Y ∗ . In this case, borrowers
are overcompensated for the in￿ationary tax and, as a result, they can aﬀord to buy additional capital with the extra
resources. In addition, in￿ation increases the marginal cost of investing, u, but lenders are particularly hurt because
they face and interior solution.
14Assume that the economy starts oﬀ at the steady state, and that an unexpected one-time
decrease in the growth rate of money ε < 0 occurs at t =0 ,i . e . b g0 = ε
1+π. Since the monetary
contraction occurs through OMOs, H0 increases above its steady state level (H0 > 0). According
with the law of motion for government bonds, Hs
t = τHs
t−1, Ht gradually returns to zero to avoid
changes in the long term in￿ation rate. Thus, the one-time money contraction at t =0i sf o l l o w e d
by a monetary expansion, i.e. by a ￿sterilization policy￿. In particular, the size of τ < 1 determines
the speed at which such monetary expansion takes place.
Using the law of motion of money supply and bonds, one can obtain the following path of money
growth15
b g0 = −∂d0,
and
b gt = −(R − τ)τt−1b g0.
Notice that this path is fully determined by the exogenous initial shock, and converges to zero
at a rate determined by the size of τ. In particular, a larger τ implies a smoother sterilization of
the monetary contraction.
To complete the characterization of the dynamics of the model, we need to solve for the paths
of b vt, b qt and b Kt. Linearizing equation (9) yields
b vt = b gt−1 − ρ
³
b Kt−1 − b Kt−2
´
,
where ρ =( a + c − G
0
) K∗
Ms/p.N o t i c et h a tb v0 = 0 because both output and the money supply used
15Here we compute the absolute deviations of the government-debt to money ratio ∂d0 instead of the percentage











t , transform variables to render
them stationary, and linearize to obtain b gt =( R−τ)∂dt−1. Next, use the law of motion of government debt to obtain
∂dt = τ∂dt−1 = τ
t∂d0, which together with the previous expresion implies that b gt =( R−τ)τ
t−1∂d0 = −(R−τ)τ
t−1b g0.
15for transactions in the goods market are predetermined. Next, linearizing equation (8) we obtain










ρ b Kt+1 − (1 − β0)b gt+1,
where 1
η = −G00K∗
nG0 > 0.16 The equation above describes the forward-looking nature of capital
prices, i.e. the price of capital at t = 0 depends on the whole path of capital distributions across
types.
Finally, using the three expressions above, as well as the linearized versions of equations (1), (2)
and (3), it is easy to show that b Kt satis￿es the following non-homogeneous second order diﬀerence
equation for t > 2
θ0 b Kt = θ1 b Kt−1 + θ2 b Kt−2 + ￿0τt−2b g0, (11)
where θ0, θ1, θ2,and ￿0 are constants that depend on steady-state variables (see Appendix B). It
can be shown that for β0 close to 1, these constants are given by: θ0 =1− ρ > 0, θ1 ≈ 2θ0,
θ2 ≈− θ0,a n d￿0 ≈− (1 − τ)2. This last term re￿ects that a money injection at t = 0 generates a
negative trend in Kt as a result of the sterilization that takes place after the injection.
The previous equation summarizes the equilibrium dynamics of the model. It can be shown
that b Kt exhibits persistent and dampening cycles, as summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 2. For β0 suﬃciently close to 1 and π =0 ,
(i) the general solution to (11) is
b Kt = Art cos(ωt − φ)+Aττtb g0 (12)
where A and φ are constants, r =
p





, and Aτ =
￿0
θ0τ2−θ1τ−θ2.17
(ii) r is close to, but less than, 1,a n dω is close to, but larger than, zero.
16The term
1






K−K∗, and so it can be interpreted as a measure of the







16Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary. b Kt exhibits persistent and dampening cycles.
To fully characterize the equilibrium solution, we require two additional conditions on the
trajectory of b Kt. For reasons that we explain brie￿y, monetary injections via OMOs imply b K0 =0 .
Thus, the equilibrium path of the distribution of capital can be completely characterized in terms
of b K1. Using these two conditions, we obtain
A =






Before proceeding to study the eﬀects of a monetary shock, b g0, it is useful to analyze ￿rst the
simpler case of a real shock. In particular, suppose b g0 = 0, but b K1 > 0. This corresponds to
an exogenous redistribution of capital. This exercise illustrates that our monetary model retains
the powerful ampli￿cation mechanism displayed by the the real-economy version of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). The following lemma presents this result
Lemma. b Kt attains its maximum at t∗ =
φ





Proof: When b g0 =0 ,t h e nA =
b K1
cos(ω−φ),c o s( −φ)=0 , and b Kt =
b K1
cos(ω−φ)rt cos(ωt − φ). There-





We have previously noticed that lim
β0→1
ω =0 , and lim
β0→1





= ∞, we only need to prove that lim
β0→1




This can be easily shown by using L￿Hopital rule, and the de￿nitions of r and ω.
Let us turn now to the monetary shock. As we already mentioned in this case b K0 =0 . T h i s
result follows from the following four facts: i) the money contraction occurs in the bonds market;
ii) the shopper￿s only resources are the money balances accumulated during the previous period
17and the land holdings; iii) borrowers￿ consumption is predetermined, and as a consequence, lenders
consumption is also predetermined; iv) the nominal price of consumption at the moment of the
shock does not change. These facts together imply that at the moment of the shock households
cannot change their investment level.
We now solve for b K1 following a monetary shock at t = 0. For this purpose, combine (1), (2),
and (3) to obtain
















p−1 is the aggregate steady-state level of debt in real terms, and K−1 corresponds to the
borrowers￿ steady-state capital level. We consider two relevant cases at this point: in one debt is
fully indexed, while in the other debt can only be partially indexed. A fully-indexed contract states
that borrowers must compensate lenders for any unexpected in￿ation. Thus, debt repayments
at time zero are immune to period one￿s in￿ation π1, i.e., R0B−1 = 1+π1
β0 B−1. Such contract










p0K−1 = q0K−1. Otherwise, borrowers will repudiate the contract, and will
be able to renegotiate the debt down to the market value of the collateral.18 T h i si st h ec a s ew ec a l l
partial indexation of debt contracts because following a monetary shock, debt can only be indexed
up to the market value of the collateral. We now discuss these two cases separately.
18The model of debt implicit in our model is the same as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Collateral constraints
arise in this economy because of the following two assumptions. The ￿rst is that once a borrower has started to
produce with capital Kt, he is the only one with the skill to complete production in period t+1. The second is that
the borrower￿s human capital is inalienable. These assumptions guarantee that if a borrower ever repudiates his debt
contract, then he is able to renegotiate the debt down to the market value of the collateral. See Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), page 217.
183.1 Partial indexation
When debt is partially indexed, R0 in (13) is not the equilibrium value. Rather, the term R0
B−1
p−1 is









ε + β0(R − τ)b g0
i
.











Since the expression above is algebraically simple, we can use it to analyze whether following
the one-time monetary expansion in period t =0 ,i ti st h ec a s et h a t b K1 > 0a n ds ob Y2 > 0. Further,
if b K2 > b K1, since the model exhibits persistent dampening cycles, we should observe a boom in the
economic activity as borrowers￿ capital level increases. Proposition 3 summarizes the conditions
under which these results hold. Let α ≡ cK∗
Y ∗ < 1 be the fraction of steady-state output consumed
by the borrowers.
Proposition 3. For β0 suﬃciently close to 1 and π =0 ,
(i) following a one-time increase in the money growth rate ε > 0 at t =0 , borrowers increase
their capital holdings in period t =1 ,i . e . b K1 > 0. Further, the lower τ,t h el a r g e r b K1 is.
(ii) if τ is suﬃciently close to 1 then b K2 > b K1,w h i l ei fτ → 0 then a suﬃcient condition for
b K2 > b K1 is that α > 1
3.
Proof: (i) When β0 → 1i ti st h ec a s et h a tρ → α and that rh → 0. Then, θ0 → (1 − α). Thus,
when β0 → 1 from equation (14) we have that: b K1 → 2−τ
1−αb g0, and since τ < 1a n db g0 > 0
it follows that b K1 > 0. Notice that the more slowly government debt returns to the steady
state, i.e. the larger τ, the lower the multiplier of monetary policy in the ￿rst period.
19Under partial indexation, the solution for b K1 is the same as that implied by the non-homogeneous second order
diﬀerential equation for t =1a n d b K0 =0 .




θ0 b g0, and since when β0 → 1w eh a v et h a tR → 1




1−α − (1 − τ)2
i
b g0.I fτ → 1, then b K2 → 1
1−α b K1






b K1,s ot h a t b K2 > b K1 if
α > 1
3.
It is surprising that in this model, a monetary expansion generates a boom in output. Since due
to the endogenous limited participation lenders are the ones handing in the cash to the government,
one may guess that output should decrease. However, as shown in Proposition 3, this does not
happen. It is interesting to highlight the mechanisms behind this result. For this analysis, it is
useful to rewrite equation (13) as












where the left-hand side represents consumption and investment in t = 1, and the right-hand side
are the real balances brought from period t = 0. In particular, the ￿rst term on the right-hand
side are output sales; the second term is new debt contracted in t = 0; and the third term is the
repayment for debt contracted in t = −1. Notice that consumption in t =1i s￿xed because K0
remains at the steady-state level. Thus, the only way borrowers increase their investment in capital
K1, is if the right-hand side of the equation is large than its steady-state value.
First, notice that due to the monetary expansion b g0 > 0, the level of prices in t = 1 increases, so
that π1 increases (b v1 > 0). This hurts the borrowers because the ￿rst term on the right-hand side
a+c
1+π1K−1 decreases. However, this decrease is more than compensated by an increase in
β0q1K0
1+π2 .
This term increases because π2 decreases (b v2 < 0). In fact, in the general equilibrium of the model,
an increase in the borrowers￿ capital level K1 is consistent with a decrease in π2.T h i si ss ob e c a u s e
when borrowers increase their capital, then in the following period output increases (b Y2 > 0), and
prices decrease (b v2 < 0). Further, this decrease in prices can be reinforced if the government starts
reversing the monetary expansion, i.e. if b g1 < 0. In fact, as indicated by part (i) in Proposition 3, a
lower τ implies a higher b K1, precisely because a lower τ is equivalent to a larger money contraction
20in t = 1 and a larger price decrease in t =2 .
Finally, since the third term on the right-hand side represents the repayment for debt contracted
in t = −1, it indicates the role of debt indexation. In particular, under full indexation, since
R0 = 1+π1
β0 , then this term would remain at its steady-state value. However, since under partial
indexation R0 increases by less than the increase in 1 + π1, then this term would decrease. This
represents a transfer of wealth from creditors to debtors, so that under partial indexation borrowers
have even more resources to buy capital. In fact, as will be shown in numerical exercises, under
partial indexation the ampli￿cation of the monetary expansion is larger than what it would be if
full indexation was possible.20
Part (ii) in Proposition 3 indicates the role of τ in the strength of the real eﬀects following the
monetary expansion. In fact, when the sterilization policy is smooth, i.e. when τ is large, borrowers
further increase their capital stock in t = 2. This implies that they would be able to borrow more
against their collateral, and their capital holdings will increase for a number of periods after the
shock. This occurs because when the sterilization is smooth, then the government contracts the
money supply in small amounts during several periods, and so the nominal interest rate remains
below the steady state, i.e. b Rt < 0 for a longer time. In contrast, when the monetary expansion is
reverted quickly, i.e. when τ → 0, this dynamic pattern for capital may not necessarily hold, unless
further conditions are imposed.
3.2 Full indexation
The collateral constraint implies that there is an asymmetry between monetary expansions and
contractions. A monetary expansion increases the price of the collateral by less than period one￿s
in￿ation π1 so that 1+π1
β0
B−1
p−1 >q 0K−1, so that full indexation is not feasible.21 In contrast, a




p−1 <q 0K−1. In this case fully-indexed contracts are feasible.
20The redistribution of wealth between debtors and creditors following a money shock has been emphasized by
Fisher (1933).
21See numerical examples below.












To solve for b K1 we ￿rst need to solve for b q1, which in turn depends on the whole sequence { b Kt}.
Solving equation (??) forward we can obtain a solution for b q0 and b q1, as shown in Appendix C.
The expression that relates b q1 with b K1 is algebraically complicated.
We can use equation (15) to gain some intuition on the real eﬀects of a monetary contraction
under full indexation. Suppose initially that the real price of capital remains unchanged after the
monetary shock so that b q1 =0 . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h er e a le ﬀects of the shock depend on the size of




,t h e nK1,a n da l s oY2, move in the same direction as the
monetary shock. This is generally the case because β0 is close to 1, case in which τ is close to 1
too. Finally, this change in the distribution of capital toward the less productive agents induces an
decrease in the price of capital, b q1 < 0, which reinforces the initial eﬀect of the shock. Therefore,
a one-time monetary contraction under full indexation generally induces a redistribution of capital
towards lenders, and decreases output. The following section illustrates the dynamics of the model
with a numerical example.
4 Numerical examples
To illustrate the magnitude and persistence of monetary shocks in this economy, we assign values
to the parameters of the economy and simulate the eﬀects of a one-time 1% increase in the growth
rate of money. We choose the parameters of the model to satisfy the assumptions imposed. It is
worth mentioning that we were able to verify the predictions presented above for a large set of
parameters. We set β0 =0 .995 to simulate a time period equal to a month. Note that β0 is close
enough to 1, in line with many of the proofs presented above.
We normalize to unity the total stock of capital, i.e. K = 1, as well as the nontradable fraction
of output, i.e. c = 1. The production technology for lenders is: G(K)=B(K − K)γ,w h e r e
22B is also normalized to unity. We set γ =0 .5 and perform sensitivity analysis. We set n =3 ,
which implies that in this economy only 25% of the agents are constrained. Finally, we choose a
steady-state capital distribution of K =0 .25, i.e. lenders hold 25% of the total capital.
Figure 2 displays the eﬀects of a one-time increase of 1% in the growth rate of money when
π =0a n dτ =0 .9. Recall that in this scenario there is partial indexation in equilibrium. The
￿gure shows percentage deviations from steady-state values. Since τ is large, the subsequent money
contraction is smooth and government bonds go back gradually to their steady-state Hs =0 . A s
is shown in the graph, this policy generates ample and persistent dampening cycles. The cycle
starts with an increase in borrowers￿ capital holdings, as well as an increase in output. The peak
of the cycle is reached about 50 months after the shock, when borrowers￿ capital is 30% above the
steady state, while output is around 3.5% higher. It takes about 100 months before both variables
reach levels below the steady state. Notice also that the minimum points reached are only 15% for
capital and 2% for output, which are lower than the absolute value of the maximum points. Since
the collateral constraint binds, real borrowers￿ debt mimics the behavior of capital.
These results emerge from the combination of two mechanisms that aﬀect both sides of the
collateral constraint: one is the asset-price eﬀect, and the other is the interest-rate eﬀect. First,
there is an increase in real price of capital that increases the value of the collateral for a number of
periods. This increase in the asset price comes from the fact that to clear the capital market, the
users cost for lenders has to increase. Notice that the real price of capital is above the steady state
for 50 months, which is exactly the time at which capital and bonds reach their peaks. Second,
although the nominal interest rate increases in the period of the shock, it then decreases above
the steady state and remains low for around 50 months. This is consistent with the behavior of
the in￿ation rate. Further, notice that the nominal rate is below the steady state for a number of
periods, which indicates that this model can generate a persistent liquidity eﬀect following a money
expansion.
Figure 3 replicates the same experiment of Figure 2, but with τ =0 .1. As observed in the
￿gure, in this case the policy reversal after the shock is faster. Otherwise, the results are similar
23to the ones in Figure 2. One main diﬀerence though is that with a low τ, the multiplier for capital
and output during the ￿rst months is much larger than when τ is high. This large multiplier is
associated with the larger decrease in in￿ation in period t = 2, as observed in the graph. In fact, in
the experiment presented here this multiplier almost doubles when going from τ =0 .9t oτ =0 .1.
In particular, b Y2 =0 .27% when τ =0 .1, while it is 0.15% when τ =0 .9. However, this gap closes
after some months. In fact when τ =0 .1t h ep e a ko c c u r sa tb Y50 =3 .5%, while it is 3.53% when
τ =0 .9.
To illustrate the case when full indexation is eﬀective, Figure 4 displays the eﬀects of a one-time
decrease of 1% in the growth rate of money when π =0a n dτ =0 .9. Recall that full indexation
with no renegotiation can only occur when the borrower does not have an incentive to repudiate
the debt contract. In this model, this occurs when there is a money contraction. In this case,
the model still exhibits persistence, but the amplitude of the eﬀects is much smaller than the ones
observed in Figures 1 and 2. In fact, output reaches a trough of only about −0.1%.22
Finally, to illustrate the case when π 6= 0, Figure 5 displays the eﬀects of a one-time increase
of 1% in the growth rate of money when π =0 .4% per month, which corresponds to a steady-
state annual in￿ation rate of about 5%. In this experiment, the government chooses a monetary
contraction in period T = 5 that allows for the transversality condition of government debt to
hold.23 Results are similar to those of Figure 2, except that now the peak in output is of a
magnitude of 2% above the steady state. In this case, to get the same output peak of Figure 2 we
would need a one-time money expansion of 1.6%. In general, when π > 0 we still obtain highly
persistent eﬀects, but the magnitude varies somewhat depending on the government￿s choice of T.24
Kochelakota (2000) concludes that the magnitude of the ampli￿cation of shocks in economies
22In this model expansions are larger than contractions. This asymmetry is the opposite to that found by Kocher-
lakota (2000). The reason for the diﬀerence is that here collateral constraints are always binding for borrowers, while
this is not the case in Kocherlakota (2000). Evidence on the U.S. unemployment rate shows downward movements
that are sharper and quicker than upward movements. However, as shown by Falk (1986) this evidence is not com-
pelling for real gross national product, investment and productivity in the U.S., as well as for industrial production
in a sample of other countries.
23See details on this in Appendix D.
24When π 6=0 ,i fb g1 =0 ,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a t b K1 > 0. This is so because as explained in the text, one important
condition to obtain b K1 < 0 following a one-time monetary contraction is that b v2 > 0. Since b g1 > 0 contributes to
have b v2 > 0 ,t h e ni tm a yb ep o s s i b l et h a tw i t hb g1 =0t h ei n c r e a s ei nv2 is not enough to achieve b K1 < 0.
24with credit constraints is particularly sensitive to the value of the factor shares in the production
function. Although γ is not the capital share in our model because here we have agents with
heterogeneous production functions, we perform sensitive analysis for this parameter. In particular,
we ￿nd that for the experiment in Figure 2, as γ increases, the amplitude of the expansion also
increases. For instance, if γ =0 .8, the peak observed in output is around 6.6%. Also, if γ =0 .1,
then output increases up to 1.6%, which is still larger than the size of the shock (1% increase in
money supply). Thus, although we also ￿nd that ampli￿cation varies with γ, future work would
need to involve careful calibration of the model economy. Our only purpose here is to illustrate the
dynamics generated by our model following a one-time money shock.
5 Concluding comments
This paper presents a novel approach to the propagation of monetary shocks by combining collateral
and cash-in-advance constraints, in a world where changes in money supply occur via open-market
operations. We ￿nd that a one-time exogenous monetary shock generates persistent movements in
aggregate output, whose amplitude depends on the degree of debt indexation. Monetary expansions
can trigger a large upward movement in output, while monetary contractions give rise to a smaller
downward movement. This asymmetry occurs because full indexation of debt contracts can only be
eﬀective following a monetary contraction. In contrast, following a monetary expansion indexation
can only be partial because debtors end up paying back just the market value of the collateral.
Due to the existence of both cash-in-advance and collateral constraints, monetary shocks trigger a
highly persistent dampening cycle rather than a smoothly declining deviation.
One of the limitations of the model presented here is that since the capital stock is ￿xed, we
can only observe redistribution of capital, but not comovements in output and investment. Also,
the model we used here is simple and stylized, and some of the functional forms are not general.
For instance, utility functions for borrowers and lenders are linear. Even though Kiyotaki (1998)
has shown that persistence and ampli￿cation of shocks in the real-economy model of Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) would still hold with concave utility, in future work we plan to explore the
25implications of changes in functional forms in our model. Finally, it would be interesting, once we
modify some of the functional forms, to perform a more careful calibration. We plan to modify
the model to resolve some of these limitations in future research. In spite of these limitations, our
model is simple enough to provide insights on how credit-market imperfections work in a monetary
economy where the asset that serves as a collateral is also a factor of production.
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27A Proof of optimal solution for borrowers
We need to prove the claim that borrowers￿ optimal plan is to consume only the nontradable fraction
of output, i.e. xt = cKt−1, to borrow up to the limit and to invest all remaining resources. To
do that we compare the utility achieved under the diﬀerent alternative plans. The ￿rst one is to
follow the proposed investment path. Alternatively, borrowers can consume or save. For these last
two alternatives, we only consider single deviations from the investment path at date t =0 . 25
Consider the borrower￿s marginal utility of investing p0 dollars given that all aggregate variables
remain unchanged at their steady state levels. For simplicity let π = 0. In steady state, we have
R =1 /β0and q = a/(1 − β0). Therefore, for given prices and aggregate variables at their steady
state levels, equations (1), (2) and (3) can be rewritten as:






















=( a + c − q)kt−1 + qβ0kt. (A4)



















=2− (1 − β0) − c
q =2− a+c
q
=2− rh.L e trh ≡ a+c





kt−1 +( rh − 1)kt−2 (A6)
It is easy to check that the roots of the associated characteristic polynomial are 1 and 1 − rh.
Therefore, kt can be expressed as:
kt = A1 + A2(1 − rh)t. (A7)
where constants A1 and A1 need to be determined. Under the proposed guess, the optimal strategy
for borrowers is to use the extra p0 dollars to invest in capital. With this amount, the borrower
25Following the logic of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), ￿we appeal to the principle of unimprovability￿, which states
that to prove that our proposed strategy of investing all the extra p0 dollars is optimal, we need to consider only
single deviations from this plan at date t =0 .
28can buy k0 =1 /q units of capital at t = 0. This allows him to borrow qβ0k0 = β0 additional units
of output.26 At t = 1, consumption increases by ck0 units so that from the additional resources,
β0 − c/q can be used to buy capital. Therefore, investment is given by: k1 − k0 =
β0−c/q
q ,s ot h a t








k1 − (1 − rh)k0
i
.
























1 − β(1 − rh)
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To show that higher utility is attained in the investment path than in the consumption path,






1 − β(1 − rh)
> 1




























which corresponds to Assumption 2 in the text.
To complete the proof we need to show that higher utility is attained in the investment path
than in the saving path. Borrowers can save the p0 dollars and use the return R to commence a
strategy of maximum levered investment from date t = 1 onwards. Then, all we need to show is
that the returns from saving p0 dollars in period t = 0 are lower than the return from investing at
t = 0. Since from Assumption 1, β0 > β, using Assumption 2 is easy to show that β0 > a
a+c. Thus,
26Note that p0 dollars are equivalent to one unit of output at t = 0 prices. Also, by borrowing extra b0 = β
0,t h e
agent can demand extra β
0 real money balances in the third subperiod of t = 0, in order to buy additional capital in













Therefore, 1+rh >R, which guarantees that the investment path yields more utility than the
alternative savings path. This completes the proof that the proposed solution is an equilibrium. We
have presented an analytical proof for π =0 .F o rπ 6= 0 it is not possible to provide an analytical
proof. However, for all the numerical simulations in the text, we have veri￿ed in the computer that
the decision rules for the borrower are optimal.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let π = 0 so that in steady state u = a. Equation (11) in the text reads:
θ0 b Kt = θ1 b Kt−1 + θ2 b Kt−2 + ￿0τt−2b g0 (B1)
where:
θ0 =1+( 1− 2β0)ρ
θ1 =( 1− rh)(1 − ρ)+1+( 1− 2β0)ρ − (1 − β0)
1
η
θ2 = −(1 − rh)(1 − ρ)
￿0 = −(R − τ)
h¡
1 − 2β0¢
τ +( 1− rh)
i
Since the particular solution for the equation above is
b Kp =
￿0b g0τt
θ0τ2 − θ1τ − θ2
then the general solution is given by:
b Kt = A1λt
1 + A2λt
2 + Aττtb g0 (B2)
where Aτ =
￿0
θ0τ2−θ1τ−θ2 is a constant and the eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 satisfy: λ1λ2 = −θ2
θ0 and
λ1 + λ2 = θ1
θ0. Finally, the solutions for constants A1 and A2 can be obtained from: b K1 =
A1λ1 + A2λ2 + Aττb g0 and b K0 = A1 + A2 + Aτb g0.
30B.1 Cycles
The dynamic properties of equation (B1) depend on the eigenvalues associated to the homogeneous








The necessary and suﬃcient condition for cycles is θ2
1+4θ0θ2 < 0. Note that θ1can be rewritten
as:




Adding and subtracting proper terms, θ2 can be rewritten as
θ2 = ξ(β0) − θ0 (B4)
where:
ξ(β0) ≡ 2ρ(1 − β0)+rh(1 − ρ)
=( 1 − β0)(2ρ +
a + c
a
(1 − ρ)) > 0.
From (B3) and (B4), θ1 can be written as:
θ1 =2 θ0 − ζ(β0)( B 5 )
where:




















Finally, from (B3) and (B4), lim
β0→1
θ2 = θ0 and lim
β0→1
θ1 =2 θ0.
B.2 Proof of Proposition
To show that for β0 suﬃciently large the model exhibits cycles, it needs to be proven that θ2
1+4θ0θ2 <
0. Use (B4) and (B5) to get:
θ2


























nG0(( ¯ K−K1)/n) > 0w h e r eK1 is the solution of (10) for β0 equal to 1 and
31π =0 . Therefore, the second term in the last expression approaches to zero faster than the ￿rst
term as β0 → 1. Note that θ0
1
η remains bounded above since θ0 approaches 1 − αN(K1) > 0a n d
t h ef a c tt h a t1
η approaches a constant greater than zero. Thus, for β0 large enough the ￿rst term
dominates and the expression is negative.
It is also useful to state solution (B2) in its polar representation (See Allen, 1959, page 189)
b Kt = Art cos(ωt + φ)+Aττt,










Stability is guaranteed if the modulo r is less than 1, a result that follows from (B5) for large β0.
In addition, r i sc l o s et o1w h e nβ0 is close to 1. Thus, the diﬀerence equation displays persistent
dampening cycles.
C Forward looking solution for asset prices
This appendix gives the solution for b q0 and π =0 .F r o me q u a t i o n( ??)i nt h et e x t :










ρ b Kt+1 − (1 − β0)b gt+1
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.
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b K1 +
















θ0 − β0θ1 − β02θ2
¸
Aτb g0
which solves for b q0 as a function of b K1. Also, the following equation relates b q0, b q1 and b K1:
b q0 = β0b q1 +
¡
1 − β0¢
ρπ b K1 +( 1− β0)(R − τ)b g0
D Solution for π > 0
When the steady-state in￿ation is not zero, but π > 0, then the simple rule that following a one-
time money shock at t = 0 we can guarantee convergence of dt back to the steady state by imposing
τ < 1 does not hold anymore. Recall that since Hs
t = τHs
t−1 and when π =0w eh a v eHs =0 ,
then τ < 1 is enough to guarantee that Hs
t eventually converges to zero. In contrast, this is not
t h ec a s ew h e nπ > 0t h e nd>0. Thus, when π > 0 the ￿sterilization￿ policy needs to be changed.
In particular, assume that the economy starts oﬀ the steady state and at time t = 0 there is
an unexpected one-time increase in growth rate of money ε > 0, i.e. b g0 = ε
1+π.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
government chooses a period t = T such that from T on, the growth rate of money supply is zero,
i.e. b gt =0f o rt > T. What this implies is that for t > T,t h el a wo fm o t i o no fb dt is given by:27
b dt =
1
β0 b Rt +
1
β0 b dt−1
which is clearly unstable, since β0 < 1. Iterating forward on the equation above and imposing the
transversality condition that b d∞ = 0, we obtain that b dT−1 must satisfy:




to guarantee convergence back to the steady-state. Further, since using the law of motion of money
27This equation is the linearized version of the law of motion of the money supply when b gt =0 .
33supply we have that b gT−1 is given by:





β0 (1 + d)
b RT−1 +
d
β0 (1 + d)
b dT−2
so that b gT−1 depends on b dT−1. In summary, when the government chooses a period T such that
b gT =0 ,i tm u s ta l s oc h o o s eb gT−1 to satisfy the transversality condition. Further for periods
1 ≤ t<T− 2 we allow the government to choose any exogenous law of motion for b gt 6 0, i.e.
any rule in which the monetary expansion at time t = 0 is reverted. For instance, a natural choice
would be a gradual money contraction up to period T − 2a n dac h o i c eo fb gT−1 that satis￿es the
condition above.
When π > 0, the dynamics of capital are described by:
θπ
0 b Kt = θπ
1 b Kt−1 + θπ
























(1 − rh)(1 − ρ)
(1 + π)
.
Using the dynamic equation of capital, as well as the transversality condition for government
debt, the law of motion of money supply and the forward-looking solution for capital prices it is
possible to construct a system of 5 equations in 5 unknowns: b KT−1, b qT−2, b qT−1, b dT−1 and b gT−1.
Since this system is a function of past values b KT−3, b KT−2 and b dT−2 an iterative procedure that
starts with a guess for b K1 must be implemented to ￿nd the solution. Details on the solution
procedure are available from the authors upon request.










FIGURE 1: Steady state distribution of capital
left-hand side





FIGURE 2: capital borrowers














































FIGURE 3: capital borrowers
















































FIGURE 4: capital borrowers















































FIGURE 5: capital borroweres
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